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R E A L E S TAT E
Does the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Which
Was Targeted Primarily at Kickbacks Between Service Providers,
Also Bar Charges for Undivided, Unearned Services?
CASE AT A GLANCE
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 provides that “[n]o person shall give and no person
shall accept any portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or received … other than for services
actually performed.” The Supreme Court must decide whether this language prohibits a party from charging
for services not actually performed if the party retains the entire charge, without splitting it with any other
party.

Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.
Docket No. 10-1042
Argument Date: February 21, 2012
From: The Fifth Circuit
by Marshall Tracht
New York Law School, New York, NY

INTRODUCTION
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) was passed in
1974 primarily to address concerns about undisclosed kickbacks and
referral fees that drive up the cost of real estate settlement services.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has consistently maintained that RESPA bars charges for unperformed settlement services even if those charges are not split between parties, but
kept entirely by one provider. The real estate industry believes that
such a reading turns RESPA into de facto price controls because any
judge or jury could decide that some fees were not earned “for services actually provided” if the price appeared too high. The Supreme
Court must decide whether RESPA bans fees for unprovided services
if those fees are not split, and in doing so must decide what deference, if any, should be accorded to HUD’s interpretation of the statute.

ISSUES
Does the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 bar undivided, unearned fees, or does it only prohibit unearned fees that are split
between two or more providers?
If the words of RESPA do not provide an unambiguous answer to this
question, what degree of deference, if any, should the courts give to
HUD’s interpretation of the statute?

FACTS
The petitioners are three couples, the Freemans, the Bennetts, and
the Smiths, each of whom obtained a mortgage loan in Louisiana
from Quicken Loans. Quicken charged the Freemans $980, and the
Bennetts $1,100, as a “loan discount fee.” However, the borrowers
argued, Quicken did not provide any “loan discount,” and as a result
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these fees were unearned. Quicken charged the Smiths a $575 “loan
processing fee,” which Quicken claims was actually a mislabeled loan
discount fee. In either case, the Smiths allege that they received nothing for this fee and so it, too, was unearned.
The Bennetts filed a putative class action suit in federal court, with
which suits by the Smiths and the Freemans were later consolidated.
All three suits alleged violation of § 2607(b) of RESPA, which provides
that
[n]o person shall give and no person shall accept any portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or received for
the rendering of a real estate settlement service in connection with a transaction involving a federally related mortgage loan other than for services actually performed.
The district court granted summary judgment to Quicken, following
the majority of courts of appeals which had held that RESPA does not
bar unearned fees unless they are split or shared. The district court
refused to defer to HUD’s contrary interpretation of the statute, holding that the “plain language” of the statute dictated the result. (Under
this reasoning, the district court found it unnecessary to address
another argument put forward by Quicken: that a loan discount fee
is part of the price of the loan, like interest, and not a fee for “settlement services” that is governed by RESPA.)
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Chief Judge Edith
Jones, upheld the district court ruling, finding that the language of
§ 2607(b) “is unambiguous and does not cover undivided unearned
fees.” The court reasoned that the phrase “no person shall give and
no person shall accept” implies that the statute is only violated if two
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parties act together, one giving and the other receiving the payment.
Further, the court found that the phrase “portion, split or percentage”
supported this reading because “all three words require less than 100
percent or the whole of something.” Using the canon of construction
noscitur a sociis (“it is known from its associates”), the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the words “percentage” and “portion,” which can
sometimes include 100 percent or the entire portion, were intended
to have the narrower meaning of less than the entirety connoted by
“split.” Finally, the Circuit Court declined to give deference to HUD’s
interpretations because the statute was clear, and HUD’s interpretations—unlike regulations promulgated by notice and comment
rulemaking—were statements of policy that lack the force of law.
Judge Patrick Higginbotham dissented. Although he agreed that
HUD’s interpretation was not entitled to deference because he was
not “persuaded that the process through which it was promulgated
was sufficiently considered to merit Chevron deference,” he disagreed
with the majority’s interpretation of the statute. He would have followed a prior Second Circuit decision that held that the statute does
bar undivided, unearned settlement charges.

CASE ANALYSIS
The petitioners (borrowers) argue that RESPA was intended to
provide clear disclosure to consumers of the costs of settlement
services and to bring down those costs through the elimination of
abusive practices. According to the petitioners, the meaning of
§ 2607(b) can best be determined by considering it in context with
the preceding § 2607(a).
Section 2607(a) expressly prohibits kickbacks:
No person shall give and no person shall accept any fee,
kickback, or thing of value pursuant to any agreement or
understanding, oral or otherwise, that business incident to
or a part of a real estate settlement service involving a federally related mortgage loan shall be referred to any person.
Subsection (b) then addresses unearned fees:
No person shall give and no person shall accept any portion,
split, or percentage of any charge made or received for the
rendering of a real estate settlement service in connection
with a transaction involving a federally related mortgage
loan other than for services actually performed.
The borrowers argue that limiting § 2607(b) to cases where there is a
divided charge would render it largely superfluous, because kickbacks
are already barred under § 2607(a). Such a reading, according to the
borrowers, would also thwart RESPA’s goal of protecting consumers
from “abusive practices” that lead to “unnecessarily high settlement
charges.” Moreover, to read “percentage” and “portion” to require
a split is against common usage, under which each includes the
entirety (such as 100 percent), and at odds with their use in other
statutes. For example, a federal embezzlement statute prohibits the
misappropriation of “any portion” of the public funds entrusted to a
person. Clearly, the petitioners point out, that statute would include
someone who misappropriated all of the funds under their control.
Congress’s intent to include the entirety within these phrases is also
shown by the reference to “any” portion or percentage, which could
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clearly include 100 percent. Further, holding that this phrase only covers divided fees would render the words “percentage” and “portion”
mere surplusage, since they would add nothing that was not already
covered by the word “split.”
As to the Fifth Circuit’s argument that the statute requires both a culpable giver and a culpable recipient, petitioners argue that the phrase
“no person shall give and no person shall accept” does not require
that both always be present. It simply contains two distinct prohibitions, barring any party either from giving or accepting an unearned
charge.
Finally, petitioners argue that if the statute is ambiguous, courts
should defer to the reading of the statute promulgated by HUD (a
power now transferred to the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau,
or CFPB). Congress authorized HUD to issue “regulations” and
“interpretations” to carry out RESPA’s aims. HUD has always maintained that unearned fees are prohibited both in regulations and in a
2001 Statement of Policy issued in response to a court case that had
refused to apply RESPA to unearned, undivided fees.
The respondent, Quicken Loans, argues that RESPA was primarily a disclosure statute, like many other regulations of that period,
intended to give consumers the information and power to shop for
closing services, with market forces in turn bringing down costs.
RESPA established the Good Faith Estimate of Closing Costs and
uniform closing statements and required HUD to publish a booklet for
consumers on settlement costs. RESPA also barred referral fees and
kickbacks because these are, by their nature, hidden from consumers
and prevent the market from working. In establishing this disclosurebased system, respondent argues, Congress rejected the direct regulation of settlement service prices. The petitioners’ position, according
to the respondent, would essentially create price controls by allowing
any judge or jury to determine that a fee was partly unearned due to
overcharging. The statute is limited to changing business practices in
the industry (i.e., referral fees and kickbacks), not directly regulating
prices.
Quicken maintains, as the Fifth Circuit found, that the phrase “no
person shall give and no person shall accept” contemplates conduct
by two culpable parties, supporting that argument by pointing out that
the exact same phrase is used in § 2607(a), dealing with referral fees
and kickbacks. This is also supported by the phrase “portion, split, or
percentage,” which connotes the sharing or division of the fee. The
petitioners’ argument that “portion” and “percentage” should be read
to encompass the whole is contrary to noscitur a sociis, a traditional
canon of statutory construction that “dictates that words grouped in
a list should be given related meaning.” Here, Congress has chosen
three words, each of which commonly denotes less than the entirety.
Moreover, Quicken argues, each of these three words has a distinct
meaning within the context of the statute. “Split” generally refers to
an even division, “percentage” covers uneven divisions, and “portion”
refers to situations where a provider gives away a component of the
overall charge.
The legislative history further supports this reading, according to the
respondent, because Congress rejected an alternative bill that would
have regulated pricing, and directed HUD to study the settlement
services industry and to report back on “the necessity for further
legislation.” Among the items HUD was directed to consider was the
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question of whether “federal regulation of the charges … is
necessary and desirable.”
Finally, Quicken argued that RESPA, as a criminal statute, must be
narrowly construed under the rule of lenity.
As to the effect of HUD’s interpretation, the respondent argues that
deference is not appropriate. The “ultimate question” under Chevron
is “whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to
treat an agency’s rule, regulation, application of a statute, or other
agency action as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of
‘gap-filling’ authority.” Here, respondents argue, Congress never
indicated an intent to rely on HUD’s expertise and did not intend to
delegate such authority. Nor does the Policy Statement warrant deference because it was an agency interpretation (a statement advising
the public of the position taken by the agency), not a regulation that
has the force of law.

SIGNIFICANCE
Banks, title companies, and other settlement service providers are
concerned about the outcome of this case because under the petitioners’ reading, and HUD’s long-standing policy, RESPA bars overcharges. As stated in HUD’s 2001 Statement of Policy, one type of unearned
charge that is barred by § 2607(b) is a fee “in excess of the reasonable value of goods or facilities provided or the services actually
performed.” Industry participants are concerned that any aggrieved
borrower could assert that some charge exceeds the “reasonable
value” of the services performed and that a judge or jury could thereby
impose ex post, ad hoc price controls. This concern is exacerbated
by the transfer of authority over RESPA regulations and enforcement
from HUD to the newly formed CFPB. While there is a track record in
dealing with these issues under HUD’s guidance, there is no assurance that the CFPB will not take a harder line if it has the authority.
This makes the Court’s reasoning on whether the statute is ambiguous, and the standards for deferral to an agency’s interpretation, even
more important.
The petitioners tried to limit the concern that a decision in their favor
would allow challenges to the price charged for a good or service.
Rather, the petitioners argue, their position would only bar fees for
goods or services that are not actually provided, and would not include
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examining whether a fee for actual goods or services was excessive.
Such a reading, of course, would reject the position taken by HUD
(and presumably the CFPB), that RESPA is intended to sweep broadly
in cleaning up business practices in the settlement industry. It does
sound odd, as well, to suggest that RESPA would prohibit a totally unearned fee, but not allow a challenge to, say, a $5,000 fee for recording
the loan documents.
It should be remembered, of course, that RESPA is not the only game
in town. Unearned charges or overcharges can be challenged on
numerous other grounds, such as state statutes barring consumer
deception and unfair business practices.
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